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Abstract. Nowadays, many people are losing considerable wealth due to
online scams. Phishing is one of the means that a scammer can use to deceitfully
obtain the victim’s personal identiﬁcation, bank account information, or any
other sensitive data. There are a number of anti-phishing techniques and tools in
place, but unfortunately phishing still works. One of the reasons is that phishers
usually use human behaviour to design and then utilise a new phishing tech-
nique. Therefore, identifying the psychological and sociological factors used by
scammers could help us to tackle the very root causes of fraudulent phishing
attacks. This paper recognises some of those factors and creates a cause-and-
effect diagram to clearly present the categories and factors which make up the
root causes of phishing scams. The illustrated diagram is extendable with
additional phishing causes.
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1 Introduction
Human life has signiﬁcantly changed as a result of online services including
e-shopping and e-banking, etc. Although these services offer great convenience, they
are accompanied by an increase in cybercrimes and present new security threats. An
online phishing is a cybercrime to steal credentials from users, such as login and credit
card details, “by masquerading as trustworthy entities in electronic communication”
[1]. Then the attacker usually uses the collected information to sign into the genuine
reputable website, such as those that are used for internet banking, to steal from the
victim’s online account [2]. In recent years, many researchers have focused on phishing
attacks in order to offer an anti-phishing solution for protecting sensitive ﬁnancial data
from phishers. However, phishing still works, and every day brings with it new
phishing websites and techniques which steal personal credentials.
By reviewing the existing anti-phishing techniques, we understand that most of
them are trying to technically detect and/or prevent phishing attacks. We are of the
opinion that focusing on the human psychological and sociological factors that
attackers use to scam people would be an effective way to fundamentally tackle
phishing attacks. We believe that current anti-phishing solutions are useful though
insufﬁcient, as phishers always use people’s psychological weaknesses to design new
types of phishing attacks. Several studies [3, 4] have already identiﬁed some of the
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above-mentioned factors, but none of them have carried out a root cause analysis to list
all the possible psychological factors at play and the tricks that scammers use to fool
people.
The objective of this research is to identify human and psychological factors which
phishers can use to scam people and make a successful phishing attack. Listing and
categorising these root causes will enable us to develop improvement programmes for
each factor. If we know that a psychological reason, for instance gullibility, is one of
the root causes of phishing attacks then we can detect users’ gullibility level, for
example by using a psychological test and/or a trust game, as well as develop some
improvement and treatment programmes, in the form of speciﬁc trainings for example,
to improve gullibility level of to those who easily trust others. We hope that such
programmes could help reduce the number of successful phishing attacks by treating
the phishing root causes as identiﬁed in this paper. It is possible to systematically
identify users’ behaviour by monitoring their online activities, using online tests, and
providing them relevant trainings based on the detected weaknesses. Therefore, these
anti-phishing solutions can be automated.
For this purpose, we initially reviewed anti-phishing solutions to ﬁnd out which
techniques are being applied to deal with phishing attacks. We also used anti-phishing
studies to ﬁgure out how the targeted phishing attacks work and what phishing tactics
are being used by attackers. We then reviewed other studies, especially scam-related
psychological articles, to identify which cognitive factors can be used by phishers to
fool people and to design phishing attacks. We then identiﬁed tricks that a phisher
might use to scam people. We focused on a selection of tricks from the reviewed
studies, particularly anti-phishing studies. Finally, we illustrated the root causes,
including the identiﬁed human factors and the tricks used via a cause-and-effect dia-
gram. Such a diagram presents a clear and easily comprehensible picture of the issue at
hand.
For conducting our literature review we used the Webster and Watson [5] struc-
tured approach. We therefore started with searching Phishing Attacks, Anti-phishing
techniques, Social Engineering Attacks and Online Scam literatures. We performed our
queries on journal databases such as Science Direct, Google Scholar, and WorldCat,
and browsed seventy journals such as MIS Quarterly, ACM Transactions on Infor-
mation and System Security, International Journal of Security and Its Applications,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, etc. We also queried and examined
related conference papers. We selected articles that explained and deﬁned phishing
methods, root causes, and other useful information and references for our study. Then
we went through the citations of the selected articles to determine whether there were
more publications that we should review. In the last stage, we used the Web of Science
to identify more articles citing the key articles we had identiﬁed in our earlier stage.
The paper starts with reviewing the existing anti-phishing techniques. It then pre-
sents several phishing attacks. Next, it explains psychological factors which can
influence a phishing process and describes tactics scammers use to trick people.
Finally, it comes up with a cause-and-effect diagram and provides concluding remarks.
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2 Anti-Phishing Techniques
The existing anti-phishing approaches are classiﬁed as either server based and/or client
based [6], where most of the client side anti-phishing systems are plug-ins or web
browser toolbars. In recent years, many research efforts have been conducted in
developing anti-phishing systems to detect and prevent phishing emails and/or web-
sites. Table 1 indicates some existing anti-phishing techniques and grouped them into
ﬁve anti-phishing categorises based on their technical and/or non-technical approaches
to detect or prevent Phishing. Those techniques which are using webpage features like
URL and web ranking to detect phishing attacks are not able to recognise all phishing
websites. Heuristics and machine learning methods use webpage features for phishing
detection, however they mostly have “high complexity” and “high false positive rates”
issues [7]. The blacklists and whitelists need to be frequently updated. Blacklists are
only useful to detect the detected phishing websites and emails and are not agile in
responding to “zero-hour attacks” [8]. Using time-sensitive tokens works until the
criminals implement real-time attacks.
Table 1. Anti-phishing categories and techniques.
Category Techniques
Phishing emails
(Detection and
prevention)
Features processing [11–15]
Identiﬁcation and authentication [16]
Heuristics method [13, 17]
Hybrid methods [18, 19]
Phishing websites
(Detection and
prevention)
Content-based detection [20]
Visual and layout similarity [21–24]
Heuristics [25, 26]
URL evaluation [27, 28]
User activities [29]
Evaluation and ranking [30]
Whitelists [31–33]
Blacklists [34, 35]
Hybrid [36, 37]
Network-based
(Detection and
prevention)
Authentication [38–41]
Network security elements [42]
Password management tools [41, 43]
Fraudulent activity detection
(Transaction and log analysis) [44–46]
Honeypot/phisher tracer [42, 47, 48]
Improvement of user
knowledge
Knowledge evaluation and training systems [49, 50]
Warning effectiveness [51]
Prosecution Sending phishing messages [52]:
CAN-SPAM Act (18 U.S.C. § 1037) (US)
E-Privacy Directive (EU)
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
(Regulation (EU) 2016/679) [53]
Directive (EU) 2016/680 [53]
Anti-phishing Act of 2005 [54]
Fraud Act 2006 (UK) [55]
Deterrence of identity theft [52]:
Crime Ordinance (Cap. 200) (HK)
Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210)
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act
(18 U.S.C. § 1028) (US)
Credit card fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1029) (US)
Bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344) (US)
Computer fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)) (US)
Computer-related fraud (Article 8, Convention
on Cybercrime)
Fraud Act 2006 (UK) [55]
Data privacy [52]:
Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486)
(HK)
Telecommunication Ordinance (Cap. 106)
(HK)
Telecommunication Privacy Directive (EU)
E-Privacy Directive (European Union)
Data Interference (Article 4, Convention on
Cybercrime)
System interference (Article 5, Convention on
Cybercrime)
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
(Regulation (EU) 2016/679) [53]
Directive (EU) 2016/680 [53]
Fraud Act 2006 (UK) [55]
Rundschreiben 4/2015 (BA) (Germany) [56]
Fake websites [52]:
Copyright Ordinance (Cap. 528) (HK)
Wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) (US)
Infringements of copyright (Article 10,
Convention on Cybercrime)
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The phishing attacks will not disappear with “one solution” and at “one level” [9].
A study shows that even by utilising modern anti-phishing techniques, over 11% of
users read the spoofed messages and enter their credentials [10].
3 Phishing Attacks
In recent years, researchers and organisations have categorised phishing attacks in
similar or sometimes in different ways. Some examples of the mentioned categorisa-
tions of phishing tactics are “Deceptive Phishing” [57], “Malware-based Phishing” [11,
57–59], “Key-loggers” and “Screen-loggers” [57, 58], “Session Hijacking” [57], “Web
Trojans” [57], “Hosts File Poisoning” [57], “System Reconﬁguration” attacks [57, 59],
“Data Theft” [57], “DNS-based Phishing” (Pharming) [57–59], “Content-injection
Phishing” [57, 58], “Man-in-the-Middle Phishing” [57, 58], “Search Engine Phishing”
[57, 59], “Website Forgery” [58], “Social Engineering” [11], “Mimicry” [11], “Email
Spooﬁng” [11], “URL Hiding” [11], “Invisible Content” [11], “Image Content” [11].
By using the above tactics, scammers try to gain access to victims’ sensitive
information by masquerading as a reputable organisation or person. Figure 1 presents
an example of a spear phishing attack. In this example, the phisher obtains basic
information such as the name and email address of the targeted users by creating a real
website that looks like the genuine website, or by hacking a real website. The fake or
real website could be, for example, a promotional website, a lottery website, an e-shop,
or any other website which asks for a user’s personal information. Phishers can also
obtain basic user information via public data or social media. In that case, the phisher
uses the obtained information to create a phishing email.
Thus, a phisher relies on building trust, so that the victim believes that s/he is in
contact with a reputable entity. A phisher might use tricks, persuasion, visceral influ-
ence, and/or any other technique to gain a user’s trust.
4 The Influence of Cognitive Factors in the Phishing Process
Social engineering and technical tricks are two mechanisms phishers use to steal
personal and ﬁnancial credentials [60]. Social engineering targets individuals and the
result of attacks depends on human decision, trust, and other cognitive factors. “Fraud
is a human endeavor, involving deception, purposeful intent, intensity of desire, risk of
apprehension, violation of trust, rationalization, etc. So, it is important to understand
the psychological factors that might influence the behavior of fraud perpetrators” [61].
Therefore, to analyse the root causes of phishing attacks, we should study psycho-
logical and sociological factors to ﬁnd out the main reasons why a user gets caught in a
phishing net.
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4.1 Suspicion
A recent study [4] shows that suspicion is one of the determinative factors in the email
phishing attacks. The study also indicated that the users determine suspicion based on
how they process emails, systematically or heuristically.
If the users believe that their cyber action is risky then they will systematically
process the email but in case the users believe that their cyber action is safe then they
will heuristically process it.
The heuristic-systematic model [62] proposes two information processing modes.
In systematic processing, independent variables such as “source factors” directly
impact on “argument acceptance process”. In heuristic processing, on the other hand,
those independent variables may directly impact on accepting the message itself
without paying enough attention to the arguments.
Based on the heuristic-systematic model, we conclude that people who highly
involve the received email messages usually employ a “systematic processing” strategy
which cause high suspicion about the phishing emails, whereas those who weakly
involve the messages usually employ a “heuristic processing” strategy which cause low
suspicion about the phishing emails.
For instance, a user who think that cyber activities are very risky usually has focus
on the email’s message cues, where a user who think that cyber activities are quite safe
usually has not enough focus on content cues.
Fig. 1. Example of a phishing attack flow
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4.2 Trust
Trust is deﬁned in this context as the “willingness of taking a risk”, which means
sometimes people trust a beneﬁciary when they believe that this trust will be beneﬁcial
for them, even though they know that it is possible to lose something in this relation
[63]. That is one of the reasons why a victim trusts a scammer.
Moreover, characteristics of both the trustor and the beneﬁciary and the situation of
trustor are several important factors of trust. People with different cultural background,
experiences, and personal character have different propensity to trust. Some people
trust others more easily, whereas others do not trust people or entities in many situa-
tions [63]. However, the beneﬁciary’s previous behaviour as well as his/her character
are crucial factors [64, 65]. For instance, if someone had positive experiences with an
e-shop, then the person will trust that e-shop much more than an e-shop associated with
a negative previous experience.
As mentioned above, trust is one of the factors that affect a phishing attack.
Therefore, it is crucial to consider the conditions of trust, which are “availability,
competence, consistency, fairness (perceived equity), integrity, loyalty (perceived
benevolence), openness, overall trust, promise fulﬁlment, and receptivity” [65].
Sometimes people trust a predictable person or entity, more than they would others.
However, predictability is not enough to build trust, as maybe the reason of that
predictability was something else, such as “controls” [63]. In addition, we cannot
necessarily expect that a person is being fully rational when s/he trusts people or
organisations, as people might trust entities based on limited information and in many
cases “biased information” [66]. People usually trust a source of information which
they perceive to be similar to themselves, such as family members or friends for
example [64]. Thus, people cannot be sure that their trust in an email or on a website is
completely justiﬁed. Phishers might use affective trust factors and as conditions to
encourage victims to trust them.
4.3 Decision-Making
A phishing attack, especially in the case of spear phishing, is a scamming process.
Usually there are at least two steps in this process where a victim makes decisions.
Figure 2 illustrates an example of the role of decision-making in a phishing attack. In
some cases, people decide “either to trust or not trust” others [67, 68], so the ﬁrst step is
when the victim decides to trust the attacker and the second step is right before sharing
sensitive information with the attacker.
There are several parameters which influence the victim’s decision to trust an
attacker, including beliefs, values, and behaviours [69]. Decision-making is a process
in itself and a sub-process of a phishing attack. Decision-making consists of the fol-
lowing phases: “perception activity”, “mental representation”, “data processing”,
“problem solving”, and “choice of solution” [70]. Thus, a user’s abilities in each phase
can affect the result of the decision and eventually, affect the outcome of a phishing
attack. For instance, a user with better data processing knowledge and skill is more
likely to make a wiser decision. However, sometimes the decision-making process does
not play a major role in a phishing attack. In some cases, users do not have enough
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awareness of the risks of sending personal information to a phisher, or they are not
sensitive to potential losses. In such cases, phishing (A) is neutral, but making some
money (B) is considerable. When a phisher tries to attract a victim by offering an
impressive result, the user evaluates B-A as earned money [71]. Based on a previous
study [71], we can deﬁne the following possible effects of the decision-making factor in
a phishing attack:
• If the person believes that the probability of gain is high, then the effect of the
decision is low.
• If the person believes that the probability of loss is high, then the individual most
likely will not go for it, so the effect of the decision is low.
• If the person believes that the probability of gain or loss is low, then the effect of the
decision is high.
Hence, decision-making can play a major role in a phishing attack when the user
believes that the chance of either utility or loss is low.
4.4 Prediction
Phishers increase their resemblance with the targeted organisation in order to encourage
the victim to believe that the phisher is who s/he claimed. This happens because people
“predict by similarity” [72].
The individual’s previous experience, as well as the person’s knowledge, infor-
mation, and/or experience with this particular type of phishing or the phisher, will
affect the user’s prediction in a given phishing attempt. However, the level of indi-
vidual’s “expected accuracy of prediction” will affect the effectiveness of evidences and
his/her prior information about the particular phishing attack/attacker [72]. For
Fig. 2. Decision-makings in phishing attacks
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instance, if the user’s opinion or guess about a speciﬁc phishing is that it probably is
not an attack, then the person might predict that it is a normal communication, even
when the user has a degree of knowledge about phishing attacks. When a user is at the
stage of making a decision to share or not to share sensitive data with a phisher, then
some examples of the individual’s prior information and other factors which can affect
his/her prediction can be considered to be:
• Previous awareness and information about cybercrimes, especially phishing attacks,
previous phishing experience, level of trust to the entity, knowledge about sensitive
data, and risks of sharing the sensitive information with others.
• Similarity of the phisher to the claimed person or entity, how attractive is the
phisher’s offer, the phisher enforcement, real-time information, the user’s impres-
sion of the offer, and the user’s Emotional Quotient (EQ).
Where descriptions of what may influence a person’s prediction are not available or
are very limited, it is possible that the person makes a prediction based on a base rate
information [72]. If a person does not receive any awareness about phishing attacks or
no guidance or alarm is provided to warn of a phishing attack, or this person does not
take advantages of a safeguard which is in place, then the individual might only rely on
her/his prior understanding and knowledge of phishing attacks and/or the attacker.
5 Phisher’s Tactics
Phishing scammers use an individual’s behavioural weaknesses to offer attractive
promotions as well as other techniques to trick the person into fulﬁlling the desired
actions.
5.1 Scams and Tricks
The root causes of digital social engineering scams are very similar to the scams that
happen in the real world. In both cases, the scammers use techniques and tricks to gain
the victim’s trust. They target the victims’ psychological behaviours, and use the
weaknesses of those behaviours to build a strong trust. They use the discovered psy-
chological behaviours to design and create a scam. For instance, a phisher may ﬁnd out
that the victim is a person who usually tends to help others, then the scammer running a
scam by feigning that they need a person to help them [73].
One of the reasons why phishing still works is because some people desire to take a
gamble [74]. Therefore, an attractive prize or promotion could be enough to get them
into a trap.
There are some “motivational and cognitive sources of errors” when people assess a
phishing or a phisher. A phisher can use errors such as “visceral influences”, “reduced
motivation for information processing”, “preference for conﬁrmation”, “lack of
self-control”, “mood regulation and phantom ﬁxation”, “sensation seeking”, “liking and
similarity”, “reciprocation”, “commitment and consistency”, “reduced cognitive abili-
ties”, “positive illusions”, “background knowledge and overconﬁdence”, “norm acti-
vation”, “false consensus”, “authority”, “social proof”, “alter casting” [74], to phish.
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5.2 Persuasion and Influence
There are individuals who usually desire to say yes to demands made by others,
because they like reacting to “assertions of authority” [75]. They respond to others’
demands even to someone who does not have the related authority. They prefer to fulﬁl
a request or a demand, instead of investigating and verifying the authenticity of the
demander. That is why when a phisher sends a fake email, e.g. from a bank, and
informs them that “you need to change your password”, then they do exactly what the
phisher told them to do.
Moreover, “people have a natural tendency to think that a statement reflects the true
attitude of the person who made it”, and also some people usually tend to do what
others do or to say what others say, which “may prompt them to take actions that is
against their self-interest without taking the time to consider them more deeply” [75].
There are two ways that a phisher may choose to push a victim to fulﬁl the demand
[75]:
• “Central route to persuasion”
The phishing message contains very “systematic and logical” reasoning which
motivates the victim to rationally think and cogitate on the statements, and in the
end to do whatever the phisher wants. The phisher has carefully designed the
scenario and the argument, and knows the victim’s conclusion.
• “Peripheral route to persuasion”
A phisher leads the victim to do the request without thinking about it. The phisher
uses “mental shortcuts to bypass logical argument”. For example, the victims
receive an email informing them that they won thousands of dollars and a very
expensive laptop in a recent lottery promotion. This fantastic prize would stimulate
many people to give personal information about themselves and can cause people to
fall into the phishing trap.
5.3 Visceral Influence
A visceral motivation can cause less thinking about the legitimacy of transactions, as
the person’s focus is on activities that could satisfy the visceral needs. In this situation,
instead of rationally thinking about a given situation and analysing it accordingly,
people usually do not care about the outcomes of their actions and make gut-feeling
decisions. The influences of visceral factors are categorised to “low-level, middle-level,
and high-level” [76] as deﬁned below:
• Low-level: reasonable behaviour;
• Middle-level: people behaving in an opposite way to their actual interests, leading
to them being upset with what they did, as they believe that they made an unrea-
sonable decision;
• High-level: not making reasonable decisions.
Phishers create messages containing a scam reward and scam cues. Two types of
scam rewards are “reward proximity” and “vividness” [77]:
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• Reward proximity: if the phisher offers an easily and quickly-achievable reward,
then it makes the individual hungrier than when a reward is not quickly-achievable,
even if the value of the reward which is not quickly-achievable is higher.
• Vividness: when the phisher offers a very tangible reward, then it will be highly
attractive for the victim. Professional phishers create different rewards for different
targets groups to make each reward more clear and understandable for the related
group of victims.
A person with low visceral influence is more likely to focus on scam cues, whereas
one with high visceral influence is more likely to focus on the scam rewards. A victim
who has high focus on the scam reward might get hooked by the phishing attack if s/he
has low self-control, for example, and a victim who focuses on scam cues might get
hooked if s/he has a low attention to the cues, in addition to having a high level of
“social isolation”, “cognitive impairment”, “gullibility”, “susceptibility to interpersonal
influence”, and/or low level of “skepticism”, and/or “scam knowledge” factors [77].
However, even people with enough scam knowledge may follow a phishing cue if
they enjoy activities such as gambling, for example. One of the reasons why those who
have scam knowledge may still fall into a phishing trap is that sometimes experience is
in opposition to knowledge, and that abnormal conditions may increase the effect of
feelings on judgments [78]. That is a reason why some people process all the received
emails even when they know about phishing attacks. It is therefore important to focus
on the conditions which lead to decision-making. It is of crucial importance to keep in
mind that visceral factors can influence behaviour even without “conscious cognitive
mediation” [79]. For example, a person who is not hungry but starts eating just because
someone is eating a sandwich in front of them [80].
6 Discussion
One of the techniques that scammers utilise to obtain individuals’ sensitive data is
social engineering [60]. The focus of this article is on the root causes of social engi-
neering subterfuge in phishing attacks. A series of potential psychological and socio-
logical effects have been identiﬁed.
There are several methods for root-causes analysis such as “Events and Causal
Factors Charting”, “Tree Diagrams”, “Why-Why Chart”, “Storytelling”, and “Reali-
tycharting” [81]. The Ishikawa Fishbone diagram [82] is a cause and effect analysis
technique, which is useful for arranging the causes of a problem by focusing on
potential factors in an organised way [83]. All the root cause analysis techniques and
methods have useful features, however the Ishikawa Fishbone diagram was chosen to
present the root causes of phishing attacks, which have been identiﬁed in this paper, as
it is deemed to be a suitable technique to structure, categorise, as well as clearly
illustrate all the extracted root causes.
Figure 3 presents the recognised root causes of phishing scams. This diagram
consists of a main body, seven branches, and three sub-branches representing the
grouped causes that are investigated in this paper. The presented extendable
cause-and-effect diagram is a starting point, and future phishing causes could be added
to the diagram.
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Mitigating the identiﬁed causes will reduce the probability of phishing scams. Thus,
focusing on the root causes to ﬁnd and utilise appropriate mitigating techniques and
solutions is fundamental to tackle phishing attacks from the root.
By using a psychological test, we can measure a speciﬁc cognitive behavior of a
user. Then we can test the user’s vulnerability to a simulated phishing attack which is
founded on one of the listed root-causes. By choosing a sample of random internet
users and testing different root-causes, we can describe the degree of relationship
between different types of phishing attacks and their related cognitive behaviors.
If we identify an individual’s weaknesses, for example by measuring his/her
behaviors on one or some root-causes, then we would be able to design and provide
improvement programs, such as speciﬁc trainings, to immune the person against that
type of phishing attacks.
7 Conclusion
Many techniques, solutions, and tools have been developed to prevent or at least reduce
the number of successful phishing attacks. Some of these techniques try to stop
phishing emails or websites, whereas others try to notify or alert the user. There are also
other solutions available, such as improving people’s awareness of phishing scams.
However, none of these solutions have so far managed to prevent phishing attacks a
hundred per cent. Phishers are always developing new scams that the current
anti-phishing techniques cannot detect and/or stop. Furthermore, they use human
cognitive and behavioral attributes to design new tricks. This paper has identiﬁed and
attempted to categorise some of the factors that phishers might use to phish the victims.
Future studies may recognise other root causes of phishing which can then be added
to the cause-and-effect diagram presented in this paper. Meanwhile, the root causes
identiﬁed can already be used to develop new anti-phishing techniques which can
proactively prevent the future phishing scam, whether focused on the tools used by
phishers or on the users who ultimately make the decisions.
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